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Abstract:
Ethnographies originate in everyday interaction with others, but anthropologists’ 
analysis and interpretation of people’s social world is often restricted to their words 
and identifiable actions. Like in every social setting, much of the knowledge we 
acquire during fieldwork remains unarticulated and habitual. We often lack the tools 
to even become aware of it, let alone to bring it into the predicated realm. Still, 
its existence is the only basis we have for recognizing unarticulated experiences 
of others. Anthropologists have become very interested in bodily experiences, but 
have tended either to cognitively interpret the experience of others or to privilege 
their own experiences as a basis for ethnography. I argue that we should instead 
use our own bodily experiences to intersubjectively recognize those of others, and I 
propose avenues for doing so.
Keywords: the body, ethnography, participation, methodology, intersubjectivity, 
victimhood
Introduction
Researching the body has become enormously popular in the social sciences, and the 
body occupies a central place in many newer writings about society. One would assume 
that this preoccupation with the body would also lead the social sciences to a thorough 
methodological reflexion on the processes of knowledge generation t h r o u g h  o n e ’s 
o w n  b e i n g  (der Leib, the living body, following Husserl’s use), but surprisingly, 
only a few scholars have engaged with such reflections in print. We have still little un-
derstanding of how we as researchers actually conduct research on other people’s expe-
riences, which are, by virtue of our being, lived through the body. Although this is very 
much a phenomenological question, my concern here is with its methodological dimen-
sion. How can we access the bodily experience of others? Or, asked in more general 
terms: how do we actually generate anthropological knowledge? This paper asks how 
we can become attentive to the part of our knowledge generated during our research 
experiences that usually remains, for various reasons, unarticulated both in our field 
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notes and in our publications: knowledge that has not yet undergone predication, neit-
her in academia nor in the societal environments we are working in. It is such know-
ledge, however, which helps us to recognize what is important in our informants’ life 
worlds and that shapes the conclusions we draw on the formation of the social. 
The paper offers several methodological avenues to unearth this kind of know-
ledge. It argues that habituation, a necessary part of the fieldwork experience is the con-
dition of the possibility for moments of dislocation1: moments that are based on inter-
subjectivity and give us insights into the experiences of the other. I draw on Agar (1985), 
Fabian (1995) and Zigon (2007) and their enquiries into what can be called ‘stumbling’ 
as an important moment for insight in the ethnographic endeavor. I depart, however, 
from their rather cognitive approach that relies on making mistakes and noting dif-
ferences between ‘the other’ and the researcher (see also Throop 2010b and below); 
instead, I am more interested in non-predicated habitual knowledge and habituation as 
a condition for the possibility for moments of dislocation to occur. I use the (somewhat 
unsatisfying term) ‘non-predicated’ for things not yet, or not anymore, discursively ap-
prehended. In Husserl’s phenomenology, the term pre-predicative is usually used. I use 
‘non-predicated’ because I do not want to suggest a chronological order (a point I will 
come back to at the end of the paper), and to accredit it with a momentary state (-ed) 
rather than an inherent attribute (-tive).
Methodological literature in anthropology gives us many tools to unearth infor-
mation, but it tells us little about how precisely we generate knowledge in our everyday 
lives as researchers. Scholars who have reflected on this question often explore it as a 
consequence of their interest in the body and its role in relating one’s being to the world 
and participating in the formation of the social (Featherstone, Hepworth and Turner 
1991; Förster 2001, 2011; Jackson 1989; Hastrup and Hervik 1994; Okely 1994, 2012; 
Stoller 1989; Wacquant 2004; Wikan 1991). As I argue elsewhere though 2012, in the 
course of the formalization of an anthropology of the body in the past three decades 
(Lock and Farquhar 2007; Mascia-Lees 2011), instead of moving closer to a social sci-
entific understanding of the bodily dimension making up our agency and shaping our 
lived experience (see Csordas 1990, 1993; Ingold 2000), we have adopted too distanced 
a gaze on the body (der Körper, following Husserl’s use).2
One reason for this failure, I believe, is that methodological explorations are in-
separable from theoretical concepts. Research on bodily knowledge is often conducted 
from the assumption, typically informed by Foucault, that discourses invariably and 
forcefully shape individual and social experience. It is assumed that people  r e p r e s e n t 
or that experiences are  i n s c r i b e d. This assumption, however, is based on a cognitive 
act of distantiation on the researcher’s part, an act that eliminates the actual experience by 
concentrating on its residuals. Identifying representation and inscription is already an act 
of abstraction on the researcher’s part – and is only one of the myriad possible outcomes 
of lived subjectivity. If we concentrate on them from the outset, we run the danger of not 
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1 I use the term ‘dislocation’ not the way post-structuralists like Ernesto Laclau use it (see also Norval 2009). 
 It should merely indicate an inter-rupture of something that has been habitual, see below.
2 My own approach to the anthropology of the body and the anthropology of experience closely follows  
 the work of Csordas (1990, 1993) and Ingold (2000) who adopt a phenomenological approach to the sub- 
 ject matter. They, however, leave me unsatisfied when it comes to the methodological question of how we 
 can access other people’s bodily knowledge (see below). More generally, there is a renewed interest in 
 ‘the ordinary’ and on ordinary practice such as dwelling, building and walking (Ingold 2000; Musharbash 
 2009) in relation to the environment. This scholarship often explores bodily experience in its cosmological 
 dimension, though (see, for instance, Stang 2009). I am concerned about this because it leaves out the 
 political and discursive dimension. This scholarship, in my view, marks a shift back to looking at ‘structures’. 
 The consequence of this seems to be (but does not have to be) that people are taken out of the ethno- 
 graphy and the ethnographer abandons a critical analysis of their agency – vis-à-vis real structures.
properly understanding bodily experiences, jumping instead to conclusions that fit our 
theories. Furthermore, this way of looking at the body concentrates on how discour-
ses shape individual narratives (Jackson 2002) and concludes from these discursively 
shaped ways of narrating on the realm of experience. It is of course indisputable that the 
public discourse makes available codes for articulating one’s own experiences. This does 
not, however, mean that one’s very experiences are necessarily subjected to these codes.
Hannah Arendt problematizes this relationship between the public and the pri-
vate. She argues that what is possibly articulated in the public realm, and what fails to 
be heard or seen, is predetermined by what is socially considered relevant in a certain 
context (Arendt 1958: 51ff.). However, she insists that the impossibility of articulating 
one’s experiences in the public realm due to dominant discourses does not mean that 
such experiences do not exist or matter. They may undergo ideological shifts due to 
their interplay with the public sphere, but they do not have to. Things left unsaid con-
tinue to matter. If they matter – and anthropology certainly is sensitized to things left 
unsaid and to experiences that resist predication – how do we find methods that do 
not exclusively study the discursive dimension of society? How can we take the bodily 
and non-predicated dimension of experience seriously and access individual and social 
experience grounded in the body? In what follows, I propose practical avenues of how 
to access the experiences of the other, and tentatively suggest what this entails for anth-
ropological research in general.
Noting Ethnographic Experience
I start with a small vignette from my research with apartheid-era victims in today’s 
South Africa.3 The vignette describes a key moment, far into the second period of my 
field research in 2010, which made me better understand how I had been conducting 
research all along. This key moment progressively changed my perspective on what is 
important in victims’ lives.
I had met Ms Nolasti Twala, an elderly member of the victims’ support group 
Khulumani who lives in Philippi Township, Cape Town, frequently during the time of 
my research. I never saw her alone, but always visited her together with other women. 
She would welcome us in her house. Her English was very poor and my isiXhosa neg-
ligible, so that we could only exchange warm greetings and give each other the comfort 
of being happy to seeing one another. Ms Twala has a very strong and warm manner to 
her and her presence always had a good impact on my well being during our visits. The 
fact that we could not communicate verbally did not discourage her to speak to me in a 
flow of words now and then; and without understanding the words I believed I grasped 
how she was and a crucial part of what she wanted to communicate. This specific type 
of interaction characterized many other situations during my research, as well (Kessel-
ring 2012). Often I just listened and sat there, absent-minded or attentive to catch some 
words; just generally keen to be around the women, but not so alert as to understand 
everything that was going on. In order not to overwhelm and be overwhelmed by a 
quest for complete cognitive understanding, I actually often preferred just to be present. 
Similarly, people mostly did not seem to mind my being around them and gently 
allowed me to partake in whatever they were doing. What they were doing was limited. 
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3 This paper is based on 19 months of field research among apartheid victims in South Africa between 2009 
 and 2013.
6Anthropological methodology insists on participating, but there was little real activity 
in which I could directly participate.4 The women’s everyday life was not structured 
like life in a village. They did not work the field or go about daily income generating 
activities. These elderly women did not pursue a regular task that I could have shared; 
they were unemployed or beyond working age. Their activities mainly evolved around 
their children and grandchildren with whom many shared a small house or a shack, and 
around trying to survive on precarious means dripping in through social grants and 
their children’s occasional jobs. Their active days were over; sometimes too early com-
pared to the age on their identity cards. Whether a day was good or bad depended on 
how their sugar level was and how their arthritis or wounds from torture or bullets felt, 
for instance. Hence, the activities I shared with the women were often limited to sitting 
together and to the occasional attendance of meetings of the support group Khulumani. 
4 On friendship and shared activity during field research, see Ridler (1996). See Wacquant (2004) for a  
 prime example of how social scientists try out methodologies to access other people’s experiences by way 
 of shared activities, in his case, he learnt himself how to box among boxers in an American ghetto.
Ms Nolasti Twala in 
front of her house, 
Philippi, Western 
Cape, May 2009.
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It was not always clear what kind of data this research environment could generate. 
Both conversation and shared activities were limited, and there was no easy access to my 
research questions: how discourses of law and the body shaped people’s subjectivities. I 
was shy, and cautious not to ask my informants to put their experiences of victimhood 
into words. On the one hand, I did not want to cause any harm to them, on the other 
hand, I wanted to understand which discursive forms they themselves chose for their 
victimhood.
In a revealing moment, however, Ms Twala told me something that changed my 
perspective, or rather, sharpened my attention for something I had practiced but not 
been capable of understanding cognitively. When I was about to leave for a longer re-
search journey into the country, I said good-bye to Ms Twala and the others. At the mo-
ment of leaving her house and hugging her, she spoke, and someone translated: ‘She says 
that her body always felt much better whenever she sees you, Rita.’ In that moment, 
I was just very moved; it was only over the following days and weeks that Ms Twala’s 
words made me think about the bodily dimension of social interaction. I slowly started 
to realize that there is a most important bodily dimension of victim subjectivity, one 
that goes beyond tangible signs of injury. In the months that followed, parts of which 
I still spent in the field, I realized that my informants’ bodies had importance beyond 
being the site of strength or fragility, and that, methodologically, the body was more to 
me than just the venue of inscription of a discourse or one part of a (material) argument 
for victimhood.
Here I was, twenty years after Paul Stoller’s “The Taste of Ethnographic Things” 
(1989). His work epitomizes how doing research changes the researcher. Stoller con-
ducted research among the Songhay in Niger from the mid-1970s onwards, and later 
wrote about his conversion from a hard-core linguistic anthropologist (equipped with 
‘a language attitude survey, a census, and tape-recorded linguistic data’ [1989: 4]) to a 
practitioner of experiential anthropology (‘Slowly, I uncovered an important rule: one 
cannot separate thought from feeling and action; they are inextricably linked’ [1989: 5]). 
The anthropology of the body has since been explored; but as briefly elaborated above, 
it generated limited insight into how to understand the sensory dimension of research, 
let alone the experiencing dimension of being injured.
The “Writing Culture” project had also been initiated more than twenty-five ye-
ars ago (Clifford and Marcus 1986). It had primarily been concerned with the notation 
of ethnographic material (see also Sanjek 1990). The authors’ concern was textual the-
ory and textual form. They focused on power relations and the extraction of readable 
knowledge, but its protagonists also enquired into the conditions under which ‘data’ is 
being ‘collected’. Although the contributors to “Writing Culture” were concerned with 
the production of ethnography, they scarcely reflected upon the bodily dimension of 
generating knowledge.
The two questions which the early writings in the anthropology of the body 
and the “Writing Culture” project raised seem to persist up to today: how to take note 
(through cognition and the senses) of what is beyond the verbal, or non-predicated; and 
how to note down what is neither verbal nor a clearly distinctive action. Fieldnotes, the 
basis for ethnography, are often void of such sensory experiences (see also Ottenberg 
1990).
The almost mythological status of fieldnotes as recorded observations has  
obscured the pertinence of the highly emotionally loaded ‘headnotes’,  
the unwritten recollections. This has fostered a view of intentionality as  
located in a disembodied mind, and a view of agency as the outcome of  
cognitive rationality alone. (Hastrup 1994: 174)
After the experiences with Ms Twala, I searched for notions of the body in my 
fieldnotes, and found indeed little direct indications to it apart from references to the 
Moments of Dislocation … Noting Ethnographic Experience
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injured body – to wounds, experiences of torture, chronic illness etc. Had I just not jot-
ted down my ‘headnotes’? How could I then retrieve them? Or had I not n o t e d such 
experiences at all, as the body had not been the focus of my research questions? – Only 
after several re-readings of my fieldnotes, I realized they did hold information about the 
body, after all, although jotted down in an untrained and unsystematic manner.5 
The question of what precedes notification of ethnographic experiences thus 
deserves a more systematic reflection: How do we even come to note certain ethno- 
graphic experiences we make?6 In other words, how do we come to ‘attend’ to so-
mething? Phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty ponders the notion of attention 
and suggests that paying attention turns something which has been there as ‘horizon’ 
into a new object.
To pay attention is not merely further to elucidate pre-existing data, it is to 
bring about a new articulation of them by taking them as figures. They  
are performed only as horizons, they constitute in reality new regions in the 
total world. […] Thus attention […] is the active constitution of a new  
object which makes explicit and articulates what was until then presented as  
no more than an indeterminate horizon. (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 35)
Merleau-Ponty does not indicate through what kinds of processes such a ‘new 
object’ is constituted. Thomas Csordas (1993) draws on Merleau-Ponty’s (and others’) 
work and attempts to look at the operationality of what he calls ‘somatic modes of 
attention’, which are, according to him, ‘culturally elaborated ways of attending to and 
5 I certainly believe that observational data can and should include a record of bodily interaction (and that  
 anthropologists can learn a lot from body culture, theatre or sports studies to start describing body practice). 
 There is a danger, however, that this kind of data is interpreted in a behavioristic manner only. Analyzing 
 the bodily movements of people needs to be complemented with a phenomenological approach in order to 
 understand what these kinds of bodily interaction may mean, otherwise one easily slips into primatology 
 and projects it onto persons (e.g. Sugawara 2005).
6 I do not want to suggest a chronological or hierarchical order between notification and noting. How to  
 write about the body and bodily experiences (both in fieldnotes and in publications) is at least as pertinent 
 as the question of how to adopt a sensory and intersubjective approach in our research practices.
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with one’s body in surroundings that include the embodied presence of others’ (1993: 138). 
Attention implies both ‘sensory engagement’ and an ‘object’, and he therefore suggests 
including in a definition of attention both attending with and attending to the body. 
In other words, it is prominently one’s own body which is the means to connect to 
others’ experiences (see also Widlok 2009). This is similar to Kirsten Hastrup (1994), 
who understands the body as a medium which gives access to what may still be non-
predicated.
The feel for ethnographic relevance to a large extent is mediated by the  
bodily and sensory experience that may precede linguistic competence. 
(Hastrup 1994: 227)
Although readily comprehensible and indeed revolutionary for anthropological 
scholarly literature as a whole, notions of scholars like Hastrup and Csordas are also 
slightly tautological: It is through our own bodily experiences that we can come closer 
to experiencing the experiences of others. But how do we then decrypt our own bodily 
experiences? H o w  p r e c i s e l y  d o  w e  a t t e n d  w i t h  o u r  b o d i e s  a n d 
a t t e n d  t o  b o d i e s?
Field Research as a Maussian Experience
The question of how we attend relates to the ways in which we grow accustomed to 
a new research field. In the literature on anthropological methodology, the habitual 
dimension of the researcher’s knowledge is a major concern. Knowledge acquired in 
(our first) socialization has to be revised in anthropology’s rite of passage: the second 
socialization. Here, habituation can be seen as an obstacle to truly access foreign forms 
of sociality (cf. Girtler 2001: 65ff.). How can a researcher take on his or her informants’ 
perspectives if the environment in which s/he has grown up and has lived for most of 
her/his life has shaped him or her culturally and socially? Förster (2001) suggests that 
‘seeing’ (sensory activity) instead of ‘observing’ (cognitive activity) is a way to acquire 
(habitual and non-predicated) knowledge that avoids ‘looking for’ cognition as pre-
defined by our own categories of knowledge. In order to ‘observe’, we need to direct 
our cognitive attention to a predicated subject. Seeing, in contrast, does not condition 
the predicated or the normative. Hence, Förster pleads for a rehabilitation of the eve-
ryday act of seeing. He attributes a habitual dimension to seeing and participating, but 
nonetheless grants the possibility that we resume attention. What we with hindsight try 
to understand in a predicated manner is, he argues, closer to lived experience than had 
we started with predicated intentionality at the first place (2001: 22).
My argument closely follows Förster’s line of thinking but my concern is a 
slightly different one. I suggest that there is a distinct quality about what is experienced 
through the body. Embodiment of experience means that subject and object have mer-
ged into a way of being in a world. Embodied experiences do not easily have a referent 
in the world. It is thus difficult to refer to them in a social exchange.7 ‘Being embodied’ 
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7 To take but one example of bodily experience, pain: Elaine Scarry (1985) is often quoted for the  
 inexpressibility of pain. According to her, pain has no referential content – contrary to most other interior 
 states of consciousness which refer to an object in the external world. We feel for somebody, we fear  
 of something. This, Scarry calls the human being’s capacity to move out beyond the boundaries of one’s 
 own body into an external world we share (1985: 5).
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necessarily refers to something internal that first needs to be externalized or: predica-
ted. This entails a shift in consciousness, though, that is probably larger than making 
something visible into an object.
General literature on fieldwork practice not only argues that (first) habituation 
shapes our outlook, but that we need to go through (second) habituation as quickly as 
possible. A quick ‘immersion’ into the new environment is typically aspired to. The 
sooner one learns the daily in and outs of a place and a particular community, the sooner 
one can start focusing on the ‘real’ issues. During the first months in the field, anthropo-
logists need and want to become streetwise and an active and somewhat self-sufficient 
agent in a new environment (Gupta and Ferguson 1997). As a consequence, we are 
anxious to as quickly as possible overcome newness and relegate it to the habitual space 
of our being. Necessarily, there is a degree of habituation in this process. We cannot 
constantly reflect on everything and disallow everything from becoming part of what 
is normal.
In short: familiarization with the field and the sedimentation of certain routines 
are necessary (but not sufficient) preconditions for research. This process of habituation 
is precisely what makes the anthropological approach unique (see also Herzfeld 2009). 
This is our prime technique and gives us unique access to the lifeworlds of others. Now, 
as necessary as this may be (for knowledge production and, sometimes literally, survi-
val), this also has its downside for a thorough generation of anthropological knowledge. 
Habituation may turn against us: on the way of becoming habituated to a new environ-
ment, we lose attention.
To understand this (normative and technical) problem better, let us apply Marcel 
Mauss’ notion of techniques of the body (1934) not to the object of anthropological in-
quiry, but to the researcher him/herself. Mauss wrote that, once a technique is mastered, 
attention recedes into the horizon. This is a problem for anthropology. It means that 
as soon as we have acquired a technique (anything from movements to wordings etc.), 
attention to it dwindles. By gaining habituation, we lose attention. So how can what 
has been habitual or non-predicated knowledge re-enter the realm of cognition? How 
precisely can we resume attention? Mauss does not say that we lose the ability to access 
newly acquired knowledge upon habituation. But we need something that triggers our 
attention. In his lecture, he uses the example of the difference between the French and 
the English way of marching during World War I, something the Englishmen realized 
when a regiment set out to march along French buglers and drums. Marching and music 
could not possibly be aligned. The ‘wrong’ combination was the trigger to recognize 
the difference in trained and habituated gait. Heidegger (1996 [1953]), in turn, uses the 
example of a hammer (‘ready-to-hand’, zuhanden) which becomes ‘present-at-hand’ 
(vorhanden) in a moment of ‘breakdown’, that is when the hammerhead becomes loose 
from the handle (see also Zigon 2007: 134–138).
Moments of Dislocation: How We Come to  
Attend 
I suggest we can distinguish two processes through which we come to attend to so-
mething. First, the way from ignorance to (cognitive) knowledge: We notice something 
which we did not note cognitively before; we learn something new because we are ex-
posed to something new. It is what phenomenologists Alfred Schütz and Thomas Luck-
man call ‘a new theme’ (1974: 187ff.; see also Waldenfels 2004). We then place this new 
experience into a relation to relevant structure and content that we have previously 
acquired.
Moments of Dislocation: How We Come to Attend Moments of Dislocation …
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We can state generally that the less familiar a total situation is the greater the 
attentiveness will be with which one turns to it, so to speak, ‘on one’s own’. 
[…] In other words, if one cannot be routinely oriented in a situation, one must 
explicate it. And if one knows that in advance, then he also in advance turns to 
it ‘voluntarily’. (Schütz and Luckmann 1974: 191)
But themes do not necessarily have to intrude, there is also what the phenomeno-
logists call ‘motivated thematic relevance’: Both ‘imposed’ and ‘motivated’ attentiveness 
are triggered by a ‘theme change’. All of this happens in the cognitive reflective realm. In 
other words, the kind of knowledge which we acquire through this first process, from 
ignorance to knowledge, is cognitive.
There is a second process through which we come to attend to something: from 
(cognitive, habitual or non-predicated) knowledge to recognition. In these cases, we 
attend to something to which we have grown accustomed. That means that something 
has been present in our experience habitually or not predicated (but possibly also cogni-
tively). Due to a specific (yet to be defined) incidence, the habitual or routinized dimen-
sion gets unmasked, so to say, and we recognize something ‘anew’. Knowledge from 
which we move to recognition can be non-predicated, cognitive and habitual. The latter, 
habitual knowledge, is particularly interesting for my analysis here. It has not become 
a ‘theme’ yet, yet it is knowledge. In order to disentangle this seeming contradiction, I 
draw on Schütz and Luckmann for their definition of ‘habitual knowledge’:
Habitual knowledge is on hands in situations, not simply at hand from case to 
case. […] It is not necessarily cogiven in the horizon of every situation, […] 
rather it is only continually “ready to grasp”.  [… I]t is not thematized and it 
is rather automatically included in situations and acts. Habitual knowledge 
presents “definitive” solutions to problems, which are organized in the flow of 
Ethel Khali in her 
mother’s house in 
Tsolo, Eastern Cape, 
August 2009.
Photo: R. Kesselring
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lived experience without one having to give them attention. (Schütz and Luck-
mann, 1974: 108)
Habitual knowledge is thus knowledge which has gone through a process of se-
dimentation (see also Ostrow 1990). It ‘flows’ precisely because it is not a theme. Marcel 
Mauss, Pierre Bourdieu (1977) and Paul Connerton (1989) confirm that the acquisition 
of habitual knowledge requires sensory experience. It is only through a process that 
addresses the senses that something can recede to the background of our attention and 
assume a habitual dimension in our perception of the world. Recognition of knowledge 
that has turned habitual or that resides in the non-predicated realm can happen in dif-
ferent ways. The first way, and one that is immediately apparent in a scientific tradition 
that privileges recognition as a largely cognitive act, is recognition based on new cog-
nitive knowledge which helps me to recognize a new element of my (non-predicated) 
knowledge about the world. An activity such as reading and reflection directs our atten-
tion to something that thereby enters the realm of the predicated. This is indeed crucial 
for anthropological interpretation. Very often, for example, reading what other scholars 
have written gives us a completely new understanding of things we know from the field 
without ever having thought about them.
But given our bias toward the textual, verbal and visual, we tend to forget ano-
ther form of recognizing: through sensory and bodily information (cf. Förster 2014). A 
sensory or bodily experience is one important possibility of accessing habitual know-
ledge. It can give us access to what has resided in the non-predicated realm. Examples 
are tastes, a touch, smells and sounds (see also Leder 1990; Howes 2005). Even the 
environment shapes our perception of the world and is therefore a source of recogniti-
on. Drawing on theories of place, scholars suggest that we are not only embodied but 
also ‘emplaced’ (Casey 1996; Ingold 2007); there is thus a ‘sensuous interrelationship of 
body-mind-environment’ (Casey 1996: 7). On a more methodological note, Pink (2008) 
draws our attention to the fact that we the researchers, too, are ‘emplaced’ in ethnogra-
phic contexts and engage in place-making practices.
In Swaziland with 
Amanda Mabilisa, 
June 2009.
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A sudden recollection through one of these sensory channels, and our attention 
is drawn to something we have never thought of consciously. This kind of recognition 
enters our corpus of predicated knowledge about the world upon sensory stimulation. 
Not only new pieces of knowledge help us to recognize previously made experiences as 
such, but also new experiences can help us to recognize what we have known in a non-
predicated manner. Mauss’ example of the English military gait that is not compatible 
to French military music is one such incidence. The resulting confusion may be the 
beginning of a cognitive reflection on the respective gaits. In any case, both sensory and 
cognitive stimulus, if successful, result in a moment of dislocation. We halt, we stop; and 
something in what we understand about the world changes.
In anthropological field research, creating the condition for the possibility of 
recognition or: moments of dislocation is particularly important. In other words, we 
have to acquire a new stock of (habitual, non-predicated and cognitive) knowledge from 
which we can then potentially learn something new about our informants’ lifeworlds 
and the world in general. Typically, we enter a new field with our ready-made know-
ledge about it. We have research questions in our mind, we have read literature and 
come with our theories and concepts, and many other ideas of how the world (is suppo-
sed to) function(s). This kind of cognitive knowledge is often very stubborn, as much as 
we would like to be open for its overthrow by new experiences. But we sometimes do 
make new experiences which contradict our taken-for-granted notions about the world.
My contribution thus follows a small number of scholars who, more or less sys-
tematically, have tried to systematize stumbling as a moment that leads to insights. Fabi-
an (1995) writes on making mistakes and ethnographic misunderstanding as a source of 
insight. Agar (1985) examines the researcher’s own taken-for-granted ways of acquiring 
knowledge. Similar to what Zigon (2007) calls ‘moral breakdown, Agar identifies ‘man-
dated breakdowns‘, hence the failure to understand, as the source of knowledge. These 
scholars have primarily looked at the cognitive and sought to understand the predica-
ted. My own enquiry is complementary to theirs in that it focuses on moments where 
the researcher’s habituated being confronts non-predicated knowledge. I thus not only 
shift focus onto the non-predicated but also approach the theme from a ‘positive’ ang-
le: we begin to understand because we have been acquiring non-predicated knowledge 
that we have not even been aware of. Certainly, the predicated and the non-predicated 
always interact and condition one another. 
In what follows, I lay out two ways how non-predicated knowledge that we ge-
nerate as part of our research experience can be recognized by us as information about 
our informants’ experience of the world. Of course, we cannot assume that the resear-
cher and the informants – or any two persons sharing a social situation – can ever make 
an identical experience. Or in Husserl’s words: ‘Each person has, from the same place in 
space and with the same lighting, the same view of, for example, a landscape. But never 
can the other, at exactly the same time as me (in the originary content of lived experience 
attributed to him) have the exact same appearance as I have. My appearances belong to 
me, his to him’ (Husserl 1989: 177). Habitual knowledge shapes our perception of the 
world. People have a different stock of knowledge when they encounter one another. If 
we share an experience even as banal as walking together (see also Gilbert 1990), we do 
not experience it in the very same way.8 Hence, we can thus only look for ways through 
8 Kusenbach (2003) elaborates on what she calls the ‘go-along method’ where she, more or less  
 systematically and informant-driven, accompanies people on their daily errands and other practical every- 
 day activities (in urban settings). ‘Go-along’ as method oscillates between interviewing and observing 
 people. It remains unclear to me how exactly the researcher can access the informants’ spatial, social and 
 emotional experiences that emerge as part of these joint activities (see also Gilbert 1990). One important 
 advantage of ‘going along’ is, of course, that the researcher understands better how knowledge relates to 
 immediate action more so than in interviews or by way of observation.
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which we can  r e c o g n i z e  other people’s experience without having experienced the 
world in an identical manner.
Imagination: What We Can Share
Most would agree that the participatory dimension of the anthropological method pro-
duces some kind of shared experiences. This is not to say that observing, or seeing 
for that matter, cannot result in shared experiences; but as many argued before, mere 
observation potentially produces distance. Doing something together is by default a 
sensory and bodily activity that leaves impressions on the researcher (see also Spittler 
2001). These impressions often are and remain non-predicated. For that very reason, 
not everyone subscribes to sharing experiences as a valuable ethnographic method. Ge-
ertz (1986), for instance, rejects any possibility of knowledge production as a result of 
shared experiences.
We cannot live other people’s lives, and it is a piece of bad faith to try. We can 
but listen to what, in words, in images, in actions they say about their lives. 
As Victor Turner […] argued, it is with expressions – representations, objecti-
fications, discourses, performances, whatever – that we traffic. […] Whatever 
sense we have of how things stand with someone’s inner life, we gain it through 
their expressions, not through some magical intrusion into their consciousness. 
(Geertz 1986: 373)
Judith Okely (1994) is one of the few scholars who have tried to clarify what Ge-
ertz discards as ‘magic’. She conducted research on elderly people and elderly people’s 
14
Poster produced by 
apartheid victims 
at workshop with 
UK and US lawyers, 
Johannesburg, July 
2009.
Photo: R. Kesselring
Moments of Dislocation … Imagination: What We Can Share
9 Strictly analytical, one has to distinguish between the process of the formation of something shared and 
 the product coming out of that. The latter entails a shared intentionality and includes everything from  
 an idea to an action. Here, I lump it together because my main interest is the process of how we establish 
 a shared reference of a part of the world. I am thus interested in intersubjectivity as the basis for  
 recognizing the other rather than the product itself. One could of course argue that intersubjectivity is 
 already a product.
10 According to Emirbayer and Mische (1998), imagination is one element of agency. Förster understands 
 imagination as a practice. I cannot claim to contribute to this debate here and refer to Förster’s writings 
 (2013).
homes in rural Normandy, France. Just like I was confronted with elderly and sick peo-
ple who had lost much of their mobility and agility due to their age and the bodily mani-
festations of their suffering under apartheid, Okely was faced with inactive informants 
with whom she had to find creative ways to connect her own and their lifeworlds. As a 
consequence, her fieldwork partly consisted of working in the fields – something her in-
formants had done all their lives before they were transferred to the institutions. Okely 
suggests to substitute what Geertz calls ‘magic’ with sensory knowledge and ‘one which 
is gained through experience of the everyday rather than confined to distilled external 
representations’ (1994: 48). She criticizes that the authors of “The Anthropology of Ex-
perience” (Turner and Brunner 1986) understood experience as events and expressions. 
As a way of accessing the everyday experience of others, she suggests to work through 
what she calls vicariousness: ‘The anthropologist cannot replicate others’ experience, 
but she can use her own [experience] for a vicarious understanding to surmise others’ 
experience’ (Okely 1994: 47). As such, the ‘having been there’ assumes a quite different 
meaning from anthropologists’ typical assertions of authority as regards their interpre-
tation of happenings in a particular locality.
My cumulative experience in the field and a familiarity with aspects of the  
subjects’ past or present through participant observation were conveyed  
back to them, not just through words but through their recognition that I had 
‘been there’ and had experienced something similar through bodily presence, 
action and sight, sound, taste, touch or smell. I had engaged in agricultural  
labour of the kind they had once known. Here a distinction can be made 
between subjective experience which is individual, and creative understanding 
which is an approximation to empathy but never complete. (Okely 1994: 49)
If we include the possibility of sharing experiences vicariously both ways bet-
ween researcher and researched, the grounds to potentially access informants’ experi-
ences must be rethought. Sharing experiences then does not mean that something is ex-
perienced together, but time and place of a shared experience may be different for each 
of the persons. Whether directly experienced together or not, it becomes much more 
clearly tangible as a joint experience in the act of sharing it than in the act of experienci-
ng it. Shared experience may result in  s h a r e d  i m a g i n i n g.9 Shared imagining may 
include to experience something vicariously, as in Okely’s research where she physically 
experienced what her informants had been doing their whole lives before they had met 
in a retirement home. Imagining, then, refers to an idea of how something is done or is 
supposed to be done (which may result in a shared intention, see Gilbert 1992, 2009). It 
is normative for the persons who share an imagination, but it is not necessarily in com-
pliance with dominant discourses. Imagining is mostly non-predicated (Förster 2013), 
but it may also emerge in an articulated form when it seems conducive or necessary.10 
For it to enter the predicated, it needs a (verbal or sensory) trigger to be r e c o g n i z e d. 
My argument that shared experiencing is possible even if removed in time and 
space may sound counterintuitive especially when considering the criticism against 
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non-ethnographic methods and its assumptions of what is being shared (e.g. bridging 
intercultural differences). However, by making this point, I want to precisely emphasize 
the fact that there has to be something to mutually refer to indeed for shared experien-
cing to work.11 Engaging in agricultural practice per se does not, of course, suffice to 
recognize every other farmer’s personhood.12 Gaps in time and space need to be bridged 
through a direct exchange, for instance, about the ways the respective hands are equally 
marked by the work with soil, and ‘thick knowledge’ to contextualize the exchange. 
We do not only have to be contemporaries but also share a face-to-face (ideally ‘thick’) 
encounter. Duranti (2010) makes a similar point when outlining Husserl’s idea of inter-
subjectivity not as ‘reading the mind of the other’ but as ’trading places’: ‘[Husserl’s] 
idea [of intersubjectivity] is not that we simultaneously come to the same understanding 
of any given situation (although this can happen), but that we have, to start, the pos-
sibility of exchanging places, of seeing the world from the point of view of the Other’ 
(Duranti 2010 : 21). 
My research entailed numerous instances of shared imagining. Just like in Okely’s 
research, my research with elderly or injured people meant that I often lived ‘aspects 
of [their] former lives’ (Okely 1994: 53). In the course of my research, I witnessed how 
members became too ill to attend Khulumani meetings, for instance. When I went to 
11 Borneman (2011) may call the something the ‘third intersubjective’.
12 For Husserl (1989: 91), ‘nature is an intersubjective reality and a reality for me and my companions  
 of the moment but for us and all those who must enter into an interaction with us and can come to  
 an understanding with us about things and people’ (translation by Duranti 2010:22). This reminds  
 us that, while there is always the possibility that intersubjectivity leads to an understanding, it can  
 easily fail. 
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13 In a similar vein, Throop (2012: 87–88) interprets a key moment in Malinowski’s research on the  
 Trobriand with his inability to fully understand casual talk. On intersubjectivity seen from a linguistically 
 oriented anthropology, see Duranti (1993). Duranti also provides a detailed analysis of Husserl’s use of 
 intersubjectivity, which, according to him, includes acts where language is not involved (2010: 17). 
14 Within the constraints of this paper, I cannot reflect sufficiently on the relationship between the two 
 registers, and I would be very reluctant to turn it into a methodological maxim. Jackson, in contrast, writing 
 on rituals among the Kuranko in Northeastern Sierra Leone, suggests an ‘ethical preference’ for  
 embodied communication over speech: ‘While words and concepts distinguish and divide, bodiliness 
 unites and forms the grounds of an emphatic, even a universal, understanding’ (1989: 135).  
the township subsequently, they inquired about what had been debated at the meeting. 
As time passed, I grew into someone who went to the meetings for them; to report, 
but also in my own right as someone who did what they could not do themselves any-
more, but of which they had a clear idea what it had meant to them. With many of the 
more active members, I shared the experience of trying to make Khulumani’s work and 
members’ concerns and needs legible to the state. Without romanticizing this (our ideas 
of social justice and social equity most likely differed widely): we jointly experienced 
our respective daily attempts of working towards them. With one executive member in 
particular, I had a very close relationship. Our shared concern was national and regional 
governance in the organization. This meant that we regularly talked for hours about 
what the problems were and how they could be addressed. By doing so, we learnt a lot 
about the other’s imagination, which, in turn, helped us to clarify our respective under-
standing of what was and what needed to be done. Another dimension of experiencing 
vicariously cuts across time. My travels to different branches of Khulumani, which is 
present nation-wide, took me to places where people had been in the 1970s or 1980s as a 
domestic worker or for a visit. My visit to Soweto, to Mthatha in the former homeland 
of Transkei or to Zwelethemba in the rural Western Cape, as an instance, came to mean 
a visit to what they remember of and associate with the place (activism, work, family, 
imprisonment etc.).
Intersubjectivity: How We Come to Recognize
So far, I have shown that shared imagining can be the basis for something else: a shared 
r e f e r e n c e  to an experience. But how does this shared reference turn into a shared 
perception, and the possibility for recognition? Ms Twala, by telling me how my pre-
sence influenced her being, made me aware of the intersubjective dimension of con-
ducting research. Intersubjectivity means that two or more people share a judgment 
of aspects of the world they inhabit and that they understand this as a given in their 
interaction, but also as part of their world. In the case of Ms Twala and myself, we could 
not share much content with words. Even if this may be why we came to share much so-
ciability through non-verbal means, I am of course not suggesting that lack of linguistic 
mastery is generally beneficial for intersubjectivity to emerge (cf. Förster 2014, Duranti 
2010 and Throop 2012).13 The best possible field situation is probably one where maste-
ry of linguistic as well as non-linguistic registers can be combined.14 
Surely, as Förster (2011: 11) shows, the emergence of intersubjectivity entails a 
sensory and bodily dimension. When Ms Twala commented on her well-being and at-
tributed me a role in the fluctuations of her health, she also commented on how she 
saw me. By doing so, she expressed and reinforced an intersubjective relation and com-
mented on it through the expression of a bodily experience which directly resulted 
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from our interaction. This is very close to Michael Jackson’s (1989) understanding of 
intersubjectivity:
To recognize the embodiedness of our being-in-the-world is to discover a 
common ground where self and other are one, for by using one’s body in the 
same way as others in the same environment one finds oneself informed by an 
understanding which may then be interpreted according to one’s own custom 
or bent, yet which remains grounded in a field of practical activity and thereby 
remains consonant with the experience of those among whom one has lived. 
(Jackson 1989: 135)
I would certainly not go as far as Jackson to say that the self and other become 
one in a research situation (or ever). Geertz clearly reminds us of the limits to our ability 
of accessing one another’s experiences. But where exactly do we perceive these limits? 
Do we stop at the possibility of sharing experience through actions? Or do we ack-
nowledge the possibility of the overlapping or even merging of each others’ ‘horizons’ 
similar to what Lévinas (2003) suggests (see also Throop 2010a, 2012: 87)?
Without having a ready answer to these questions, we can nonetheless say that it 
was only as a result of intersubjectivity – which Ms Twala so plainly called to my atten-
tion – that I came to attend to what I finally thought as relevant in terms of apartheid-
era victim subjectivity. For victims, the legacy of apartheid-era violence is difficult to 
articulate, partly because strong discourses determine which experiences are publicly 
relevant and which are not. At the same time, most experiences of violence are embo-
died to the extent that victims need more or less radical social and bodily changes in or-
der to emancipate from them (Kesselring 2012). Ms Twala’s comment fell in the horizon 
of my subjective and sensory experiences in the field. That horizon had prepared me 
to attend to the embodied dimension of victimhood, but only her remark made a shift 
from  k n o w l e d g e  to  r e c o g n i t i o n  possible. I had known that my informants 
have been harmed in various ways. I had known it cognitively before even starting my 
research. I had known it habitually as my informants’ state of being had greatly influ-
enced my research experience and had regularly left me tired, worn out and deeply sad 
in the evenings. I had partly learnt to deal with these experiences in what I describe 
above as the researcher’s habituation: trying to adjust to the research environment in 
order to focus on the ‘relevant topics’. And I had known all this in non-predicated way, 
I believe, because I had somehow known I had been missing much, without being able 
to put my finger on it. I had tried to grasp victims’ subjectivity by employing a discursi-
ve approach that relied on signs of injury and utterances of harm. Ms Twala finally gave 
me the chance to look at the injured body in its lived experience, beyond inadequate 
notions of discourse and inscription.
One is never exempt from all predicated notions, and I am not suggesting that, in 
my research environment, victims are not conscious of their victimhood.15 But victim-
hood is much more than its public performance or the predications we give to it, and 
our ethnographic methodology should be able to guide us towards this ‘more’. In 
every social environment, certain experiences are not ‘a discursive object or a subject 
of articulation’ (Förster 2011: 12). In my case, the embodied nature of experiences of 
violence had let me sense people’s victimhood, but had also hindered me from accessing 
15 In fact, my study analyzed what happens when victims try to articulate their sentient victimhood in the 
 context of discourses of victimhood; whether and why they succeed to make their victimhood politically  
 effective, and why they often fail to be heard in broader society. In order to do so, they objectify their  
 own bodily experience and thus transform it. If we only look at these objectivations, however, we fail to 
 understand even them, let alone the underlying experience. I believe that, in our ethnographic endeavor, 
 we should combine a discursive analysis with a focus of non-predicated experiences. This paper explicitly 
 focuses on the latter.
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16 Both Jackson (2011) and Stoller (2008) have explored the ‘power of the between’, i.e. intersubjectivity, 
 in their recent reflections of their earlier research experience, which dealt with human suffering, want and 
 – creativity. For both, storytelling as a path to explore how we learn from one-another helps them to come 
 to theoretical insights.
17 Here, I refer to the colloquial understanding of what ‘empathy’ is. Hollan (2008) corrects this use of  
 ‘empathy’ by arguing that it not only involves the experience of understanding the other (as it is typically 
 explained) but also the experience of being understood; it is hence an intersubjective process. For  
 cutting edge research on empathy (not so much as methodology but as a human condition), see Hollan and 
 Throop (2008). I agree with Hollan and Throop (2011) and Giesser (2008) who include a bodily dimension 
 in their understanding of empathy (see also Halpern 2001 who writes on empathy in a clinical context but 
 it is, unfortunately, conceptually very vague). While my concern here is what can possibly be shared, a 
 focus on empathy maintains a ‘first person-like perspective’ (Hollan and Throop 2010: 390) by asking how 
 we can share it, though.
it in a predicated way. Ms Twala’s utterance was the trigger for me to recognize it (cf. 
Jackson 2011 and Stoller 2008).16 It was a verbal action – as outlined above, a preferred 
trigger momentum. Nonetheless, her words would have fallen on (my) deaf ears had 
I not acquired a habitual and non-predicated understanding of her and other people’s 
victimhood over many months. It was only by way of our shared experiences (of their 
daily activities, the being-together, the public and private meetings etc.) that I was able 
to grasp the relevance of what she had told me. The object of recognition was thus 
not her wellbeing and my presence alone; it was an element of my previously habitual 
and non-predicated knowledge about victims’ subjectivities that turned into cognitive 
knowledge. Cognition – partial and forever limited – again only came later once I star-
ted engaging with my fieldnotes, read literature about the body and injured personhood 
and look at photographs and other ethnographic material (see also Pink 2009: 190ff.).
Intersubjectivity is the basis for attendance to what is relevant in informants’ life-
worlds – for  r e c o g n i z i n g an element of our stock of knowledge that we have ac-
quired as part of our engagement with the world and with our informants’ lives. Inter-
subjectivity is based on experiences we make jointly. It goes beyond empathy because 
it allows for mutual recognition and a re-definition of what has been.17 It will always 
remain difficult, as Geertz reminds us, to prove the similarity of shared experiences. 
However, we should leave the door ajar for the possibility of sharing. Shared experi-
ences can be the basis for something else: a shared reference to an experience that, in 
turn, is manifest in a shared p e r c e p t i o n of the world. The fact that it is possible to 
intersubjectively recognize an overlapping of perception is a step toward proving that 
a non-predicated access to the experiences of others is indeed possible. If we deny this 
possibility, we reject the possibility of socialization more general; unless one argues that 
socialization is based on words only.
Conclusion: Compensating the Unequal
With regard to the ethnographic method, Roger Sanjek notes that ‘anthropologists have 
done a better job of using than articulating it’ (1991: 617). In this paper, I tried to articu-
late what largely remains in the non-predicated realm in reflections on the ethnographic 
method and in ethnographies themselves. 
Participation, if taken seriously, results in a degree of habituation to a new en-
vironment. We engage bodily with new forms of doing things, speaking, and relating 
to new people, objects (cf. Napier 2014), landscapes etc. However, as we grow accus-
tomed, we lose attention to the ‘new’. I suggested that there are ways through which 
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we can recognize an element of the knowledge we have acquired bodily which, in turn, 
gives us clues about what is relevant to our informants. These moments of dislocation 
trigger a process that helps us to cognitively access knowledge that was previously in 
the realm of the habitual or non-predicated. The moment of dislocation through which 
non-predicated and habitual knowledge enters our cognitive realm can happen in diffe-
rent forms. We tend to privilege the visual and the verbal, but it can as well be a sensory 
experience that dislocates us.
For moments of dislocation to occur, habituation is a necessary if not a sufficient 
condition. It is important to point out that what shifts from the non-predicated into the 
cognitive realm may recede into non-predicated realm again, namely by way of rene-
wed habituation. This is why I used the term non-predicated as opposed to Husserl’s 
pre-predicative. The latter could be misleading in that it suggests that the formation 
of predication is linear rather than circular. Even if his notion of ‘moral breakdown’ 
differs from my own argument, Zigon makes a similar point.18 He sees the possibilities 
for transformation of the everydayness in the aftermath of a ‘moral breakdown’, that 
is when ‘persons or groups of persons are forced to step-away from their unreflective 
everydayness and think-through, figure out, work on themselves and respond to certain 
ethical dilemmas, troubles or problems’ (2007: 140). It is a return to a new state of fami-
liarity, so to say, that is different from what it was before.
This paper is a search for a form of knowledge that helps us to understand other 
people’s experience without having experienced the world in an identical manner (which 
of course is impossible, or at least improvable). I lack the experience of living under 
apartheid rule and can never share these experiences, which still shape my informants’ 
lives.19 But with the help of intersubjective research experiences, I could still start reco-
gnizing the particularity of the apartheid’s legacy. For intersubjectivity to emerge, we 
need two things. Firstly, what Schütz and Luckmann call ‘we-relations’: The ‘immediate 
experience of the other’ conditions that the other ‘appear[s] to me in his [sic] live corpo-
reality: his body is for me a perceivable and explicable field of expression which makes 
his conscious life accessible to me’ (1974: 62). Secondly, we need the shared knowledge 
that we share parts of the social worlds. By imagining together, we create a shared refe-
rence to how we see the world. Such a perception often emerges from doing something 
together without putting into words what we are working towards. This overlapping 
perception is a form of non-predicated access to the experience of others. Hence, if we 
cannot experience something identically, we can at least come to a shared perception 
of the world, which gives us clues as to what is relevant in our informants’ lifeworlds.
The ground for such knowledge and moments of dislocation is intersubjectivity. 
Intersubjectivity guides the researcher’s interest toward the important questions and so-
metimes enables recognition, because it sediments experiences and directs our attention 
towards them. Formulated differently, if we take ethnographic experiences seriously, 
the intersubjective nature of research implies that our informants often lead us to what 
is relevant for them. This can be a conscious and even strategic decision on their part; 
but it has a more subtle side, in which non-predicated intersubjectivity draws us to ex-
periences close to their own, and later draws our attention to ‘themes’. Spending suffici-
ent time with our informants for processes of habituation, intersubjectivity, recognition 
and imagination to happen is central to accessing this knowledge.
18 Zigon (2007) is critical of an anthropology of moralities, which diffuses the social and the moral, and  
 suggests limiting it to what he calls a moral breakdown.
19 Rosaldo (1993: 1–21) movingly shows what can be foreclosed to the researcher if she has not first  
 experienced something similar to her informants’ experiences in the context of her own life. Consider, 
 however, Throop (2010a) for an account of how similar experiences may in fact conceal aspects of  
 another person’s lived reality.
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20 For more on ethics grounded in ethnographic sensibilities, see Jackson (2005) and Kleinman (1999).
Throop is interested in a similar process through which we come to understand. 
According to him, the ‘ethnographic epoché’ (a state of suspended judgment) is an ‘u n- 
w i l l e d  shift in attention that is enacted in the context of the ethnographic encoun-
ter, an encounter that is often defined by the recurrent frustration of our attempts at 
achieving an intersubjective attunement with our interlocutors’ (2010b: 281; emphasis 
in original). In other words, ‘experiences of estrangement’ and ‘confrontations with 
alterity’ are the source for a moment ‘where we feel some form of empathy with our 
interlocutors’ (2010b: 281). The point of entry is an interplay of inaccessibility and vul-
nerability through which we are compelled to view the other ‘as a subject and not an 
object of experience’ (2010b: 279).20 I contrarily argued in this paper that the basis for 
recognition can also be what we share by way of doing things together and developing a 
shared perspective onto parts of the world. Dislocation does not occur in ‘the between’ 
but  w i t h i n  m y s e l f. We enter into a state where moments of dislocation become 
possible by participating bodily in the lifeworlds of others, and not by willingly or un-
willingly suspending our judgment. Recognition emerges from the shared experience of 
being-in-the-world, not from ontological difference.
It is only upon a sensory engagement with others’ lifeworlds and lived realities 
that we have a chance to understand what it means to be (in a body). Encounters bet-
ween the researcher and the researched have an impact on the respective subjectivities; 
we both emerge changed. How these shifts can be shared – and whether they should be 
shared (in a field work context, see Borneman 2011), is another question. Analytically 
(and hopefully politically, cf. Herzfeld 2009), the researcher and the researched come to 
be on the same level. This sensory and bodily ethnographic experience should then also 
be reflected in the ethnography and the ways in which we write about the subject and 
forms of subjectivity. In this sense, this paper is also an attempt to renegotiate the rela-
tion between the researcher and the informants, taking forth the project the “Writing 
Culture” authors have started. If we acknowledge that any generation of anthropolo-
gical knowledge happens intersubjectively, the exclusive authority of the researcher is 
bound to dissolve.
Tsolo, Eastern Cape, 
August 2009.
Photo: R. Kesselring
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